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Speed Traps
I
Governments and police 
continue to target motorists 
with more speed cameras and 
tougher penalties despite the 
failure of  ‘speed kills’ policies, 
reports Alan Buckingham 
Saving Lives or 
Raising Revenue?
n a bid to reduce road injuries and fatalities 
the governments of many industrialised 
countries are increasing their focus on speeding 
motorists. No-one who drives on roads in New 
South Wales (NSW) or Victoria could fail to notice 
the growing stringency with which designated speed 
limits are being enforced through such things as 
speed cameras and double demerit points (DDP). 
In Britain, it is estimated that there are over 5,000 
speed cameras in operation and in 2001 they were 
used to convict over one million motorists for 
speeding. By 2004 it is predicted that there will 
be up to three million convictions from 13,000 
speed cameras.1
The British government justifies the anti-
speeding measures on the grounds of reducing the 
number of serious and fatal accidents on British 
roads. Although Britain already enjoys the safest 
roads in the world per kilometre travelled,2 the 
government has set the ambitious target of reducing 
the number of people killed or seriously injured in 
road accidents by 40% by 2010. To achieve this, 
speeding is being targeted because, according to 
the government, ‘research has shown that speed is a 
major contributory factor in about one-third of all 
road accidents. This means that each year excessive 
and inappropriate speed helps to kill around 1,200 
people and to injure over 100,000 more. This is far 
more than any other single contributor to casualties 
on our roads’.3
Similarly, in Australia many State governments 
consider speeding to be the most important factor 
contributing to serious accidents. Catching speeders 
has become a central plank of road safety policies. 
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Scientific evidence behind the 
oft-heard slogan ‘Speed Kills’ 
is flawed. Based on this flaky 
evidence draconian policies are being 
introduced that harm mostly safe 
drivers rather than dangerous drivers, 
because most safe drivers speed.
Speed Traps
New South Wales, for example, introduced double 
demerit points in 1997 and followed this with the 
installation of speed cameras, which now total 110. 
Estimates of the revenue raised by speed cameras 
in NSW vary signifi cantly—some put the fi gure at 
$40 million each year, others at over $100 million.4 
More recently, speed limits in some urban areas have 
been reduced from 40 kilometres per hour (km/h) 
to 30 km/h and from 1 November 2003 the State 
default urban speed limit will be reduced from 
60 km/h to 50 km/h. 
In Victoria the centrepiece of the government’s 
fi ve year ‘Arrive Alive Road Safety Strategy’ is a 
crackdown on speeding through a range of measures 
and new technologies including 40 km/h urban 
limits, 50 km/h rural township limits, point-to-
point speed cameras and more fi xed laser cameras. 
Currently, an estimated 42 fi xed speed cameras are 
catching 65,000 speeding Melbourne motorists and 
reportedly raising $8 million a month.5
Setting lower speed limits and getting tough with speeders might be thought of as relatively 
uncontentious areas for government intervention, 
even for those who value personal liberty highly. 
Whereas the introduction of laws forcing drivers and 
passengers to wear seat belts or motorcyclists to wear 
crash helmets were fought by libertarians on the 
grounds that the only potential for harm is to one’s 
self, the potential harm from excessive speed extends 
to others including passengers, other motorists and 
pedestrians. So why should we be concerned about 
government policy towards speeding?
The fi rst reason is that the scientifi c evidence 
behind the oft-heard slogan ‘Speed Kills’ is fl awed. 
The second is that based on this fl aky evidence 
draconian policies are being introduced that harm 
mostly safe drivers rather than dangerous drivers, 
because most safe drivers speed. The third is that the 
policies bring a host of unintended consequences, 
the most worrying of which is that the downward 
trend in the number of serious and fatal injuries 
is faltering.
Does speed kill?
The basis for the British government’s campaign 
against speeding is its claim that speed is a cause 
of one-third of accidents. This fi gure is based on 
research conducted by the government-funded 
Transport Research Laboratory (TRL), which 
collected data on police offi cers’ reports on road 
accidents they attended.6 However, it is highly 
misleading. To get the 30% fi gure the government 
categorised the following causes of accidents as 
speed related: ‘excessive speed’, ‘failure to judge 
other person’s path or speed’, ‘following too close’, 
‘slippery road’, ‘in a hurry’, ‘aggressive driving’, 
‘weather’ and ‘other’.
Only the very fi rst category is unambiguously 
related to speed and this accounts for just 7.3% of 
accidents. All of the other causes are not primarily 
speed-related and the accidents may have nothing to 
do with speed. For example, ‘failure to judge other 
person’s path or speed’ does not indicate whether 
the vehicle that was hit was speeding or travelling 
at an inappropriate speed. The cause is the failure 
of one driver to observe the behaviour of the other 
driver. Other causes, such as ‘weather’ and ‘other’, 
appear to have no obvious relationship to speed or 
speeding at all.
The proclivity of governments to add together a 
range of causes of accidents and label them ‘speed-
related’ is not restricted to Britain. The Roads and 
Traffi c Authority of NSW claims that 30% of fatal 
accidents involve speed. However, the category 
of ‘speed’ included ‘trucks jack knifi ng’, ‘fatigue’, 
‘alcohol’ and ‘speed excessive for the conditions’.7
Confusing the debate further is the way that 
‘speed’, ‘speeding’ and ‘excessive speed’ tend to be 
used interchangeably. Speed is the term used most 
frequently in British TRL reports when examining 
correlates of accidents. But it is so broad that it 
could allow the authors to record any accident as 
‘speed-related’ simply because speed is a factor in 
all collisions as objects cannot collide if they are 
not moving. 
Excessive speed, on the other hand, is speed 
inappropriate for the conditions. It would apply, 
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in average speed could be achieved and accidents 
could be reduced by 9%. The illusion created is 
that large numbers of motorists are travelling at or 
above the speed limit and that a speed reduction 
would slow these motorists down. 
Their data, however, do not support this. They 
found only 5% of traffi c to be speeding, with the 
average speed on these 60 mile per hour (mph) 
roads being 44 mph. On the most dangerous 
60 mph roads the average speed was just 35 mph. 
Reducing the speed limit or using speed cameras 
on these roads is unlikely to have much of an effect 
because most motorists are already driving well 
below the speed limit.
Moreover, correlation does not imply causation. 
The ‘fi nding’ that speed positively correlates with 
accidents, once type of road is taken into account, 
fails to consider any prior variable that might both 
explain the speed and the accident. This means that 
the relationship between speed and accidents may 
well be spurious. 
Prior variables might include a range of poor 
driving behaviours and lack of experience, but 
rarely does research bother to include such variables. 
US research indicates that lack of correct timing 
and coordination is responsible for many accidents: 
‘. . . the crucial element is often coordination. 
People need to do the right things at the right time 
in relation to what others are doing’.12 Separating 
out driving at an excessive speed as a root cause in 
its own right is meaningless.
Too little speed and accidents
When we come to the analysis of the relationship 
between ‘speeding’ (rather than ‘speed’ or ‘excessive 
speed’) and accidents, the evidence in Britain and 
Australia is remarkably thin on the ground. Indeed, 
for example, if a motorist were travelling at 50 km/h 
on black ice on a highway with a 110 km/h speed 
limit. This designation is subjective depending 
upon road condition, vehicle condition, driver 
abilities, and so on. One need not be speeding to 
be driving at an excessive speed: ‘travelling too fast 
for the conditions is not the same as exceeding the 
speed limit’.8
Speeding generally refers to exceeding the posted 
speed limit, and bears no relationship to the current 
conditions. While all speeding implies speed, it does 
not necessarily imply excessive speed. Few would 
claim that driving 10 km/h above the speed limit on 
an empty motorway in good conditions constitutes 
driving with excessive speed. 
The important point about this is that virtually all the research evidence on which policies are 
being made in Britain and Australia relates to ‘speed’ 
or ‘excessive speed’ rather than speeding. Yet it is 
speeders at whom the policies are being directed 
and it is speeders who are prosecuted. 
Even if we were to accept that speed, excessive 
speed and speeding amount to the same thing, the 
evidence of the relationship between it and accidents 
is weak. The British Transport Research Laboratory 
(TRL) has long held the reputation for conducting 
some of the most sophisticated transport-related 
research in the world. Interestingly, not only did 
the TRL researchers fi nd that just 7.3% of accidents 
were caused primarily by excessive speed,9 when 
they examined speed on rural roads it was found 
that the faster the speed of the traffi c the fewer 
accidents there were.10 This is due, to a large extent, 
to the road quality with faster roads often being 
the ‘highest quality’ roads and therefore the safest 
ones. But this only suggests that safety policy should 
concentrate on improving the quality of roads by, 
for example, building more motorways rather than 
concentrating on ‘speed’. 
In fact, the TRL’s research does suggest that 
once the quality of the road is controlled for, there 
is a positive correlation between accident rate and 
the speed of traffi c.11 So, on a given type of road 
the faster the average speed of the traffi c, the more 
accidents there are. The researchers confi dently make 
the prediction from their models that if the posted 
speed limit on 60 mile per hour roads in Britain was 
reduced by 10 miles per hour then an overall drop 
Speed Traps
While all speeding implies speed, 
it does not necessarily imply 
excessive speed. Few would claim 
that driving 10 km/h above the 
speed limit on an empty motorway 
in good conditions constitutes 
driving with excessive speed. 
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would need to drive for over 100,000 years to die 
as a result of ‘excessive speed’. Compared with 
this, staying in a British National Health Service 
hospital looks far riskier. The National Audit Offi ce 
estimates that 5,000 people die every year from 
infections picked up during stays in hospitals due 
to lack of basic hygiene.18 
Highlighting the inherent safety of road travel, 
the British Department of Trade and Industry has 
recently developed a ‘Richter Scale for Risk’, which 
lists a range of common situations in order of the 
chances of death. Of the six risk categories, ranging 
from ‘High’ to ‘Negligible’, the risk of dying in a 
car accident is in the fourth lowest category labelled 
‘Very low’, together with such things as death from 
playing football or death from an accident at home.19 
These data are averages. For older drivers the risks 
are much lower. Travelling by aeroplane is commonly 
thought of as being extremely safe and those who 
fear fl ying are sometimes regarded as irrational. Yet 
Leonard Evans calculates that an American 40 year-
old, seat-belted, alcohol-free driver in a large car 
is less likely to be killed in 600 miles of interstate 
driving than on a journey of the same distance in 
a schedule airline. Note that in these calculations 
speeding is not controlled for: the motorist is free 
to speed as much as a typical American does and he 
or she is still safer than fl ying.20 
The (in)effectiveness of speed cameras 
in saving lives
On the basis of shaky evidence of the relationship 
between ‘speed’, ‘excessive speed’, ‘speeding’ and 
accidents, Britain has witnessed an explosion in the 
number of speed cameras, from none in 1993 to 
over 5,000 in 2001. Some of these cameras catch in 
excess of 2,000 speeding motorists each day. The key 
justifi cation for them is that speeds will be reduced 
and, since the research the government relies on 
indicates that speed correlates with accidents, the 
government hopes that the number of serious and 
fatal injuries will be reduced. Unfortunately, neither 
a reduction in speeds nor a marked reduction in 
serious and fatal accidents has been achieved. Offi ce 
for National Statistics data show that in recent years 
average speeds have barely changed and, most 
worryingly of all, Department for Transport data 
show last year there was a decrease of just 0.5% in 
the number of fatalities on British roads.21
US research on speeding has established that those 
who speed moderately tend to be the safest drivers. 
It is those who travel well above and well below the 
posted speed limit who are the biggest risk. 
Most research agrees that it is those who drive 
at around the 85th percentile of the speed on a 
particular road who tend to be the safest drivers.13 
On British motorways for example, this equates 
to those who drive at about 85 mph or 15mph 
above the speed limit. Conversely, it is the slowest 
drivers who are the most risky drivers: ‘The accident 
involvement rates on streets and highways in urban 
areas was highest for the slowest 5 percent of traffi c, 
lowest for traffi c in the 30 to 95 percentile range and 
increased for the fastest 5 percent of traffi c.’14
An American 40 year-old, seat-belted, 
alcohol-free driver in a large car is 
less likely to be killed in 600 miles 
of  interstate driving than on a 
journey of  the same distance 
in a schedule airline.
Speed Traps
The problem is that British speed cameras are 
often set to catch those who are travelling around 
10 mph or more above the speed limit. This means 
that the law bears down heavily on the safest drivers 
who are travelling at about the 85th percentile of 
the traffi c speed but above the speed at which the 
cameras operate, while some of the most dangerous 
drivers, who drive slowly, are not caught. 
Fatal road accidents are very rare events
On motorways and on urban roads many of us 
speed yet speeding can rarely be a cause of serious 
or fatal accidents because data also show that there 
is just one death per 136 million km travelled in 
cars in Britain15 and just one death per 109 million 
km travelled in Australia.16 So, in Britain, given 
that the average person drives approximately 18,000 
kilometres per year it would take 7,610 years of 
(frequently speeding) travel before the driver could 
expect to be involved in an accident resulting in his 
or her death. If, as the British TRL research shows,17 
7.3% of accidents are caused by speeding then you 
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The whole point of speed cameras is to increase 
the rate of reduction in the number of serious and 
fatal accidents, but the data show the reverse. Figure 
1 below shows the logged number of fatalities on 
British roads per billion kilometres travelled, and 
the recent trend paints a depressing picture.
by speed cameras since 1993 we obtain an almost 
perfect correlation of +.97. In other words, there 
is an almost perfect linear relationship between the 
increase in speed camera tickets and the increase in 
the fatality gap.
The pattern for Australia is quite similar with the sharp decreases in road deaths in earlier 
decades coming to an abrupt halt. Between 1980 
and 1997 there was an average yearly decrease of 
2.7% in road deaths, equating to a near halving of 
fatal crashes on Australian roads. Since 1997 the 
rate has slowed to just 0.7%.
When we examine States where speed cameras 
have been introduced the trends are even less 
encouraging. Figure 2 overleaf shows fatal crashes 
for three States that have introduced speed cameras. 
NSW and Victoria have both recorded an increase 
in the number of fatal crashes since the late 1990s 
while Western Australia shows a very erratic and 
slow decline since the 1980s. 
Fatal crashes in NSW halved between 1980 
and 1991, when speed cameras were introduced. 
Since then the decline has faltered, with a drop of 
just 3% since 1993 despite the implementation 
of double demerit points in 1997 and fi xed speed 
cameras in 1999. Even less convincing is the case of 
Western Australia which has experienced a drop of 
20% since speed cameras were introduced in 1988 
compared with a fall of 40% over the same period 
for Australia as a whole. 
A more complicated case is that of Victoria. 
Here speed cameras were introduced in 1989 
and, in the following three years, fatal crashes 
plummeted 46% compared with a fall of just 26% 
for NSW. Such a sharp fall immediately following 
the implementation of speed cameras led some 
to assume that the two are causally connected.22 
However, this assumption is questionable. The fi rst 
problem is that for some inexplicable reason, the 
From 1966 until 1993, the yearly drop in the 
fatality rate was fairly consistent with an average 
rate of decrease for this period of 3%. However, 
between 1993 and 2001 (the time period in which 
thousands of fi xed speed cameras were installed) the 
trend line fl attens somewhat, refl ecting a slowing in 
the rate of drop in fatalities to 2.1%. Focussing on 
1999-2001 (the period when speeding convictions 
rose by 44%) the trend line is nearly horizontal with 
an average yearly drop in fatalities of just 0.3%. 
Something quite dramatic happened in 1993 to 
slow the decrease in fatal road accidents in Britain 
and eventually stall the decline altogether. One 
theory is that the implementation of the very fi rst 
speed cameras and their subsequent proliferation 
is a causal factor. Certainly, there is a correlation. 
If the 1966-1993 trend line had continued until 
2001 there would have been 825 fewer fatalities 
in that year than were actually recorded. If we 
correlate the increasing ‘fatality gap’ caused by the 
divergence between the 1966-1993 and 1993-2001 
trend lines with the rise in speeding convictions 
The whole point of  speed cameras 
is to increase the rate of  reduction 
in the number of  serious and 
fatal accidents, but the data 
show the reverse. 
Figure 1: Road Fatalities in Britain Per Billion 
Kilometres 1966-2001
Note: Logging the data is helpful when analysing trends since it 
shows consistent yearly decreases as a straight line and helps 
reveal deviations from it. Source: Department for Transport 
(DFT), Transport Statistics Great Britain: 2002 Edition (London: 
The Stationary Office, 2002).
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number of fatal crashes was anomalously high in the 
year prior to the implementation of speed cameras 
in Victoria. The subsequent fall gives a particularly 
positive impression of a dramatic decrease in deaths 
at the time when speed cameras were introduced. 
In other words, a key factor that explains the sharp 
decrease in fatal accidents between 1989 and the 
early 1990s is the increase in fatal accidents between 
1988 and 1989. Speed cameras had nothing to do 
with this.
A second problem is that these data do not take 
into account how many kilometres Australians 
travel each year, for if the fatal road accidents drops 
at the same rate as the total number of kilometres 
travelled drops, the risk of being involved in a fatal 
accident would not have reduced at all. In fact, as a 
result of the recession in the early 1990s the number 
of kilometres travelled did drop suggesting that the 
drop in fatal crashes was partly caused by people 
using their cars less frequently rather than the roads 
becoming safer.
Using Australian Transport Safety Bureau data it 
can be calculated that once we factor in the number 
of kilometres travelled in each State for each year, 
relative to NSW (which did not implement speed 
cameras until 1999), the drop in the fatality rate 
in Victoria following the implementation of speed 
cameras in 1989 was no greater.23 Victoria has 
always enjoyed slightly safer roads per kilometre 
travelled compared with NSW and the arrival of 
speed cameras in 1989 did nothing to increase that 
advantage.  
Double demerit points 
Is it too much to expect a large reduction in fatal 
road accidents from speed cameras given their 
scarcity and low density in Australia compared with, 
say, Britain? A larger effect might be expected from 
the NSW double demerit point (DDP) scheme 
with its stiff penalties for speeding (as well as other 
offences) acting as a powerful deterrent. Once again, 
however, despite claims made about the success of 
DDP in reducing accidents, the data do not support 
such an assumption.24
Figure 3 opposite shows the year-by-year 
deviation in fatalities from the number recorded in 
1990 in NSW. If the line dips below the horizontal 
axis line then in that year fatalities were lower than in 
1990 and if the trend line rises above the horizontal 
axis, fatalities were higher than in 1990. The grey 
Speed Traps
Figure 2: Fatal Crashes in NSW, Victoria and 
Western Australia, 1980-2002
Sources: Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Road 
Fatalities Australia: Statistical Summary (Canberra: ATSB, 2002); 
ATSB, Road Fatalities Australia: Monthly Bulletin (Canberra: ATSB, 
June 2003). 
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line shows fatalities for all 365 days of each year in 
NSW. Although we can see that in 2002 the number 
of fatalities was 30% lower than in 1990, virtually 
all of that fall occurred before the introduction 
of DDP.   
The black line shows road fatalities in the 
Christmas period over which the DDP scheme 
now operates relative to the 1990 level. What is 
interesting about this line is that the introduction of 
DDP in 1997 did not lead to a sustained reduction 
in Christmas fatalities compared with previous 
years. Furthermore, if the DDP scheme were such 
a success then we would expect a sharper decline 
in fatalities during DDP periods than for the year 
taken as a whole. In fact, for the period 1997-2002 
the drop in fatalities during the Christmas DDP 
period is almost exactly the same as that recorded 
for the complete year fi gures. Therefore, the verdict 
of the DDP scheme for the Christmas period must 
be ‘no effect’.
happen at slower speeds, with two-thirds of all 
crashes occurring at speeds below the posted 
limit. 
As for Britain, speed enforcement played no 
role in contributing to it having the safest roads in 
the world. Neither did the very rapid drop in road 
fatalities in Australia during the 1980s come about 
through speed cameras, DDPs or the associated 
speed policies. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that speed cameras are playing a role today. In fact, 
there are a number of plausible reasons why speed 
cameras may cause more accidents: 
•  Speeds are slowed near camera sites so drivers divert 
to less safe routes in a bid to save time, or they may 
try to make up time by driving at inappropriate 
speeds where there are no cameras;
•  Speeds are slowed and journey times are 
increased, leading some drivers to become 
frustrated or aggressive, and it forces all drivers 
to suffer longer exposure to accident risks;
•  Lower speeds demand and, therefore, promote 
lower attention levels;
•  Initiative to drive at the appropriate speed for 
the conditions shifts from the driver to speed 
cameras. Therefore, drivers will become less 
used to taking responsibility for adjusting speed 
according to complex, changing circumstances 
encountered;
•  Drivers prioritise speed and speedometer 
watching over safe driving;
•  Speed cameras distract the driver’s attention as 
drivers look out for the next camera rather than 
the road ahead;
•  Speed cameras cause sudden braking as drivers 
slow down to the posted speed limit.
There are other less obvious unintended 
consequences of the strict enforcement of speed 
limits. Those who drive outside the law with 
unregistered cars, cars on false registration plates 
or joy riders will be unaffected. Moreover, for those 
who previously drove within the law, there is an 
incentive to break the law by driving unregistered 
cars or cars with illegal number plates so that speed 
cameras cannot trace them.
Government pressure to reduce speed also leads 
police to prioritise enforcement of speed limits over 
other laws. This is supported by Department for 
Unintended consequences
The failure of speed cameras to reduce serious road 
accidents is not a quirk of British or Australian data. 
Similar fi ndings led the government of British 
Columbia in Canada to scrap their cameras. Data 
from the British Columbia Coroners Offi ce on 
vehicle-related fatalities showed speed cameras did 
not save lives. A 2000 report, entitled Safe Roads, 
Safe Communities, stated that the programme had 
no discernible impact on speed or on the fatal 
accident rate. It also noted that most accidents 
Figure 3: Road Fatalities in NSW Relative to 
1990 Comparing Yearly and Christmas Double 
Demerit Periods
Source: Derived from ATSB data, http://www.atsb.gov.au/road/
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Transport data for Britain which show that speeding 
convictions have risen by 229% between 1993 and 
2000 while other driving related convictions, such 
as ‘dangerous, careless or drunken driving’, have 
dropped.25
Wider implications of speeding policies
One of the most worrying aspects of the onslaught 
on speeding motorists is the likely long-term effect it 
is having on the relationship between the police and 
motorists. If the current rate of increase in speeding 
convictions continues, 7.2 million motorists will be 
convicted in Britain by 2010. This averages out at 
one ticket each year for every three motorists. We 
have already seen that speeding is rarely a signifi cant 
causal factor in accidents and serious accidents are 
extremely rare events. This means that millions of 
motorists are being convicted each year for a driving 
behaviour which is perfectly safe. It is likely that 
motorists will come to view the police’s actions as 
cynical, vindictive and unfair. 
The police’s concentration on speeding cannot 
be explained by the fact that they have so few ‘proper’ 
criminals to catch since analysis of International 
Crime Survey data by Peter Saunders and Nicole 
Billante in the Summer 2002-03 issue of Policy 
shows that the UK, followed by Australia, has the 
highest crime rates out of 17 countries surveyed.26 
Instead, police behaviour can be seen as a rational 
reaction to their situation. In recent years the police 
have found it increasingly diffi cult to catch people 
for crimes, with a clear-up rate in England and 
Wales in 2002 of 18% for robbery and just 12% 
for burglary. 
Furthermore, for many of the lesser crimes, 
where fi nes are imposed, payment levels are low. 
By turning attention to speeding motorists, the 
police can at last claim some success. Unlike the 
painstaking and often fruitless detective work 
involved in tracking down robbers and burglars, 
speed cameras catch speeders every time. There is 
also no paperwork involved since the procedure is 
automated. Finally, there is an economic incentive 
since law abiding speeders are more likely to pay 
than convicted criminals and, in England and 
Wales, the local police force is allowed to keep a 
proportion of speeding fi nes for itself. 
The danger is that motorists will notice that 
the mass conviction of speeders is being matched 
by a retreat from catching criminals. This risks 
alienating those on whose goodwill the police often 
rely.27 By regularly convicting large numbers of law 
abiding people, it is also possible that respect for 
the law will lessen in other areas.28
What can be done?
Given the evidence of the failure of speed cameras 
and the associated ‘speed kills’ policies, should we 
remove all speed cameras and all speed limits? This 
would be a mistake. Speed needs to be managed 
and sensibly enforced. Data show that those who 
travel at reckless speeds, usually well beyond the 
speed limit, are dangerous drivers. These drivers 
need to be caught and punished. Speed limits can 
also provide helpful guidance for inexperienced 
drivers who are unable effectively to use individual 
judgement about the appropriate speed. And speed 
cameras can play a role in deterring speeders at 
known ‘black spots’, where speeding can be shown 
to be an important factor in accidents. 
Re-introduce police discretion to convict poor and 
dangerous drivers
The issue then is not whether speed should be 
managed but the place that speed policy should 
have in the overall context of road safety. Speed 
in itself does not kill, but inappropriate speed can 
kill. What causes inappropriate speed is part of a 
wider issue of poor driving. Poor drivers can be 
those who simply do not care about other road 
users, they can be the inattentive or they can be 
the inexperienced. Many of these drivers, just like 
safe drivers, may speed but they are also likely to 
behave in other ways that causes accidents. 
Therefore the law and its enforcement should 
work against those who are a danger to others 
through poor driving rather than against motorists 
who break a numerical speed limit. Since speed 
cameras are unable to distinguish between poor 
Motorists will notice that the mass 
conviction of  speeders is being 
matched by a retreat from catching 
criminals. This risks alienating those 
on whose goodwill the police often rely.
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drivers and safe drivers, most speed cameras should 
be removed and a return made to tried and tested 
methods of law enforcement. 
New laws or proper enforcement of current laws 
If we are serious about road safety then it may be 
necessary to introduce new laws to make certain 
kinds of dangerous driving illegal or enforce more 
stringently laws that already exist. In some States in 
Australia tailgating (where a vehicle follows too close 
to the one in front) is illegal. This is rarely enforced 
and yet, according to a University of Adelaide study, 
rear-end collisions with the vehicle in front account 
for nearly 10% of all crashes. In Britain, there is no 
specifi c law for tailgating.29  
Driver culture
Perhaps more important than laws, however, 
are conditions that enable drivers to take greater 
responsibility for their driving decisions. This is an 
issue of safety culture that cannot easily be enforced 
through law. What makes the roads in Britain the 
safest in the world is not that drivers travel slower 
there or that the roads are of a particularly high 
standard. Similarly, what gives Belgium a road 
fatality rate three times that of Australia cannot be 
explained by the speeds that Belgians travel at or the 
number of motoring laws that exist. The difference 
comes from driver culture. 
The fundamental principle behind safe 
driving bodies such as the UK Advanced Drivers 
Association has always been taking responsibility 
by driving within the capabilities of oneself, the car 
and the environment. This involves anticipating 
events, not exceeding safety margins and leaving 
room for error. The current situation where drivers 
feel safe or blameless as long as they keep within 
the speed limit runs counter to this principle. 
Driving culture comes through evolved norms 
about good and bad driving. This can be achieved 
partly through better education and training but it 
cannot be created through more cameras, fi nes or 
double demerit points.
Why the obsession with speed? 
While some countries have recently increased speed 
limits on major roads (for example, Italy and some 
States in the US), in Britain and Australia there is 
strong pressure to reduce speeds and catch speeders. 
The British government has said that it wants to 
make speeding as socially unacceptable as drink 
driving yet, unlike the risks associated with drink 
driving, the data are not there to support the claim 
that speeding causes accidents.
It is true that the faster the impact speed the 
greater the risk of injury or death, but it does not 
follow that speeding leads to more accidents. 
Nevertheless, millions of mainly law-abiding 
people are being convicted each year. Moreover, 
to the extent that the risk of a serious accident 
has come down over the last 40 years, it is due to 
careful road engineering, sensible law enforcement, 
medical advances and massive advances in car 
safety, not speed cameras.
As the failure of the ‘speed kills’ policy becomes 
clear, the reaction of the government and police 
is not to review the obsession with speeding but 
to think of more ways of catching more speeders 
and imposing tougher penalties. Large sums of 
money are being spent on new, high technology 
equipment that photographs drivers as well as 
the car number plate. The British government 
is currently investigating GPS technology which 
offers the ability to control electronically the 
maximum speed of a vehicle according to the 
prevailing speed limit. 
The issue of speeding highlights the familiar story of failed state intervention: the 
government intervenes to improve the well-
being of some group of people (be it the poor, 
lone parents or road accident victims). Simplistic 
theories of causation are assumed about how 
the improvement can be achieved. Policies are 
applied without respect for the likely unintended 
consequences and, over time, evidence emerges to 
As the failure of  the ‘speed kills’ 
policy becomes clear, the reaction 
of  the government and police is 
not to review the obsession with 
speeding but to think of  more ways 
of  catching more speeders and 
imposing tougher penalties. 
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suggest that the policies are not working. Far from 
faith in the original policies being dented, it is seen 
as evidence that more extreme policies are needed 
to bring about signifi cant change.
The net result of years of speed cameras in 
Britain and Australia is that road speeds have not 
slowed signifi cantly, the downward trend in serious 
accidents and fatalities has been almost totally lost, 
hundreds of thousands of the safest drivers are 
convicted each year and the goodwill between law 
abiding citizens and the police is evaporating. In 
the midst of all this, British and Australian State 
governments are selling their speed campaigns as a 
great success. Don’t believe it.
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